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NOTES
The Provisional Arrest and Subsequent Release of
Abu Daoud by French Authorities t
On January 7, 1977, Abu Daoud entered France as a member of
an official delegation sent to Paris by the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO). A day or so later, French police detained and
then arrested him upon the request of the West German and
Israeli Governments. Officials of both governments announced
forthcoming requests for his extradition as a suspected organizer
of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre. This chain of events set
the stage for the most recent case illustrating the political and
legal obstacles which militate against the extradition and eventual
prosecution and punishment of alleged transnational terrorists.'
I.

EXTRADITION AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISm

Extradition has been defined as "the act by which one nation
delivers up an individual, accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory, to another nation which demands him,
and which is competent to try and punish him." 2 In contemporary
international practice, the decision as to whether an alleged offender will be extradited to the -requesting State is within the
complete discretion of the requested State. Absent bilateral or
multilateral treaty obligations, there is no legal duty to extradite.
Where treaty provisions govern, the requested State usually will
grant an extradition request only for crimes enumerated in the
treaty. Moreover, most treaties provide an exception for acts
t This article is based upon a working paper prepared for The Procedural Aspects of
International Law Institute under a contract with the United States Department of State.
The views expressed herein reflect the personal opinion of the author and are not necessarily the views of either the Institute or the Department of State.
The author would like to express his appreciation to the Institute's panel of consultants
for their reading and evaluation of the working paper. The author also wishes to express
his special gratitude to Professors Lillich and Herzog for their assistance in collecting
research materials and for their critical comments on the text of the working paper.
1. For an extensive definition of the term "transnational terrorism," see Lillich $
Paxman, State Responsibility For Injuries To Aliens Occasioned By Terrorist Activities, 26
Am. U. L. REv., 217, 217 n.1 (1977).
2. 1 J. MooRa, A TRaFnsE oN EXTRADITION AND INTERSrATE RENDITION 3 (1891). See also
A..BjLLOT, TRArr DE L'ExTRADITION 1 (1874); BLACes LAW DICrIONARY 698 (4th rev. ed.
1968). See generally F. PIcGorr, EXTRADITION 5-16 (1910).
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deemed to be "political offenses." In any event, extradition is
ultimately a political decision to be made by the government of
the requested State.3
In the context of transnational terrorism, the process of extradition takes on special significance precisely because of the "political offense" exception and the almost unlimited discretion of
governments in matters of extradition. Most terrorists will seek
asylum in countries which are sympathetic to the political beliefs
which allegedly motivated their crimes. Such countries are likely
to refuse requests for the extradition of terrorists: either they are
not parties to extradition agreements and hence are not under a
legal duty to extradite; or they will invoke the 'political offense"
exception of existing treaties. 4

For example, on December 18, 1973, Arab terrorists attacked a
Pan American jet airliner at the Rome airport. Thirty-two persons
were killed during the attack. In order to escape, the terrorists
hijacked a Lufthansa plane and flew to Athens, where they demanded the release of two Palestinians imprisoned there.5 They
then flew to Kuwait. 6 Italy, Morocco, West Germany, and the
United States made requests for the extradition of the terrorists.
Kuwait had no extradition treaty with any of these States. Moreover, the Kuwaiti Government deemed the acts of the terrorists to
be of a "political" character. Ultimately, the terrorists were handed
over to the "Arab Liberation Movement" for having committed
"crimes against the movement." 7
Given the alleged purposes and motives of their acts, terrorists
apprehended in less politically sympathetic countries also may invoke the "political offense" exception. Recently, however, the
courts in several countries have held that terrorist crimes are
without the purview of the "political offense" exception.3 They
have done so by adopting a restrictive and narrow construction of
political crimes. In Re State of Wisconsin and Armstrong,9 the
United States requested the extradition of Armstrong from Canada
on charges relating to the bombing of four buildings at the University of Wisconsin in 1972. In contesting the request for his
3. See Lillich & Paxman, supra note 1, at 300.
4. Id. at 803.
5. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
6. Id., Dec. 20, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
7. Id., Dec. 23, 1973, at 3, col. 1. For an analysis of this incident, see Lillich & Paxman,
supra note 1, at 277, 302.
8. See illich & Paxman, supra note 1, at 300-03.
9. 28 D.L.R.3d 513 (York, Ontario County Ct. 1972).
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extradition, Armstrong alleged that his acts were of a "political
character," since they were directed against U.S. involvement in
the Vietnam War. The extradition magistrate, however, ruled that
the "political offense" exception was inapplicable since no classified
research had been done on the campus and the accused was not
part of an organized political protest movement. The magistrate
also noted that the acts of the accused were directed at the property
of the university, not at the U.S. Government. The court of appeals
affirmed the decision, characterizing Armstrong as "not a political
fugitive but simply a fugitive from justice .. -."
Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison" involved a Formosan
who fled to Sweden after having been convicted of the attempted
murder of Chiang Kai-shek's son in New York City. The Swedish
Government, after some hesitation, acceded to the United States'
request for his extradition, but, while Cheng was being flown
back to the United States, he became ill and was taken to London
for medical treatment. The United States then had to reauest his
extradition from Great Britain. In the proceedings before the
British court, Cheng contended that the request should be denied
because his acts fell within the "political offense" provision of the
extradition treaty between the United States and Great Britain.
The House of Lords, however, concluded that the exception applied only to acts of political opposition to the State requesting
extradition. Since Cheng's act was not directed against the United
States Government, the request for Cheng's extradition was
granted.
The most recent application of the "political offense" exception
to incidents of transnational terrorism is the case of Rolf Pohle,
decided by the Supreme Court of Greece in October 1976.12 Pohle,
a member of the Baader-Meinhof terrorist gang, was sentenced by
a West German court in 1974 to six years' imprisonment. He was
freed the following year in exchange for a West Berlin politician
who had been kidnapped by other members of the gang. After his
arrest in Athens in 1976, the West German Government sought
his extradition from Greece on the ground that his prison term
in West Germany had not been satisfied. The court of appeals in
Athens refused the request, holding that "his acts were those of a
genuine revolutionary, and that they were not a criminal but a
10. 32 D.L.R.d 265 (Fed. Ct. App. 1973). See Note, Asylum or Accessory: The NonSurrender of PoliticalOffenders by Canada, 31 U. TORONTO FACULTY L. REv. 93 (1973).
1I. [1 9 73 ] A.C. 931 (H.L.).

12. See Judgment of Oct. 1, 1976, Wash. Post, Oct. 4, 1976, § A, at 24, col. I (S. Ct.
Greece).
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political offense." '3 The Supreme Court of Greece reversed the
decision "by adopting a very narrow definition of a political crime,
taking it to cover only actions aiming directly at overthrowing
the existing system, not all those prompted by political ideas or
motives." 11

These decisions reveal that many States regard terrorist acts as
common crimes outside the purview of the "political offense"
exception, no matter what political motivations are claimed. The
governments and courts of many other States, however, adhere to a
more flexible construction.-5 In France, for example, the Chambre
d'accusation of the Cour d'appel of Paris refused to extradite two
fugitives who were wanted in the United States on aircraft hijack-

ing charges. In the proceeding, the United States argued that
"[t]hese fugitives had not been engaged in any political activity

in the United States and were not subject to any persecution. A
halfhearted effort to direct the plane to Hanoi does not make this
crime political. Rather, the extortion of $500.000 contradicts any
assertion of 'political character.' "10 The French court, however,
held that the acts of the hijackers constituted "political offenses"
under article VI of the treaty of extradition between the United
States and France.17
II.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

On January 5, 1977, the PLO requested visas from the French
consulate in Beirut for the members of an official delegation to
Paris.18 The delegation was to attend the funeral services of Mah18. Id.
14. The Times (London), Oct. 2, 1976, at 4, col. 1. See also TnE ECONOIST, Oct. 9,

1976, at 65, col. 2.
15. See Lillich 9- Paxman, nTpra note 1, at 808.
16. E. McDowEu., DiGasr oF UNrnE STATES PRAcTICE IN INTERNAMONAL LAWv 1975, at 168
(1975). The court may have tacitly incorporated in its decision the French Government's

criticism of US. policy in Vietnam.
17. Id. at 168-69. See Extradition Convention, Jan. 6, 1909, United States-France, 87 Stat.
1526, TS. No. 561, amended, Feb. 12, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 407, T.I.A.S. No. 7075.
18. Most of the facts in the case have been obtained from the Agence France-Presse
Interview with Raymond Barre, Prime Minister of France, in Paris (Jan. 18, 1977)
(transcript obtained from the Information Service of the French Embassy, Washington,
D.C.) [hereinafter cited as Barre Interview] and the Communique of the French

Ministry of Justice Concerning the Release of Abu Daoud (Jan. 11, 1977) (obtained from
the Information Service of the French Embassy. Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as
Communique]. The Barre Interview was reported at N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1977, § A, at 1,
col. 4.
Other information was obtained from news reports. See THE ECONOM s-, Jan. 15, 1977,
at 43; Tibm, Jan. 24, 1977, at 29; The Guardian (London), Jan. 18, 1977, at 8, col. 1;

1977]

ABU DAOUD

499

moud Saleh, a former PLO representative who had been assassinated in the French capital on January 3, 1977. One of the delegates listed was Youssif Hanna Raji; subsequent events have revealed that he was in fact Abu Daoud (Mohammed Daoud Mohammed Auda), allegedly an organizer of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre.' The French consulate granted the visa requests,
apparently on the same day.20
On January 7, 1977, Abu Daoud entered France with the PLO
delegation. Although he made no attempt to alter his physical appearance and used a false Iraqi passport, Daoud encountered no
difficulties. He registered at the Rdsidence Saint-Honor, where
security arrangements had been made by the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. That afternoon, the French Director for Middle
East Affairs invited the members of the delegation, including
Daoud, to the Quai d'Orsay for a meeting. Later that day, the
French police, acting upon information from the West German
police, brought in "Raji" to verify his identity. In the evening,
when officials of the West German Ministry of the Interior sent
their French counterparts a telegram announcing a forthcoming
request for 21
extradition, the French police detained Daoud for
questioning.
On the morning of January 8, the West German judicial authorities, acting through Interpol, confirmed in writing to French
officials that a warrant for the arrest of Abu Daoud had been signed
by a judge of the Munich cantonal court. They requested that
Daoud be held in custody pending a request for his extradition.
That afternoon, pursuant to article 9 of the French-German ExtraLe Monde, Jan. 10, 1977, at 6, col. 1, Jan. 11, 1977, at 1, col. 3, Jan. 12, 1977, § A, at 6, col.
1, Jan. 13, 1977, § A, at 2, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, § A, at 6, col. 1; The Times
(London), Jan. 11, 1977, at 6, col. 4, Jan. 12, 1977, at 1, col. 1, Mar. 19, 1977, at 5, col. 2.
For a very brief summary of the facts, see Roubache, A Propos De Droit, [1977] 51-53
GAZEtE nU PA.Als [GAz. PALMis]. For a short critique of the case, see Rubin, Abu Daoud
Case: Flouting World Law, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 27, 1977, at 31, col. 1. See
generally Note, The Abu Daoud Affair, 2 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 539 (1977); Recent Developments, InternationalTerrorism: Extradition, 18 Htv. INT'L L.J. 467 (1977).
19. For a discussion of Abu flaoud's terrorist activities and his possible status as a
Jordanian double agent, see TWss, Jan. 24, 1977, at 30.
20. Prime Minister Barre states that "[t]he usual verification procedures carried out
by the Consulate did not enable it to determine the identity of the person presented
under the name of Youssif Hanna Raji." Barre Interview, supra note 18, at 1.
21. The arrest of Abu Daoud was reported to have been the work of several westem
intelligence agencies which sought revenge for the earlier murders of their agents. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, § A, at 6, col. 3.
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dition Convention, 22 the French authorities placed Daoud under
provisional arrest.
On the afternoon of January 10, Israeli officials, also acting
through Interpol, told French authorities that a warrant for the
arrest of Abu Daoud had been issued by the Israeli judicial authorities. Like the West Germans, the Israelis sought Abu Daoud
on charges relating to the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre.23 The
Israeli officials requested that Abu Daoud be arrested provisionally
with a view to extradition pursuant to article 10 of the FrenchIsraeli Convention.24
On the morning of January 11, the Chambre d'accusationof the
Cour d'appel of Paris convened in camera to rule upon the legality
of the continued provisional detention of Abu Daoud. Abu
Daoud's lawyers contended that the West German arrest warrant
was invalid on three grounds: (1) it did not contain the alias
(Youssif Hanna Raji) under which Daoud had been arrested; (2)
it had not been dated; and (3) it had not been confirmed by the
West German authorities through diplomatic channels as required
by the extradition convention. With regard to the Israeli request,

the defense argued that the French-Israeli Extradition Convention
in effect at the time of the July 1972 Munich massacre " did not
apply to crimes committed in third countries by non-Israeli nationals and that the new pact concluded in July 1975,26 which did
confer jurisdiction in such cases, could not be applied retroactively.
Newspaper accounts reported
that the public prosecutor agreed
27
with the defense arguments.
22. Convention on Extradition, Nov. 29, 1951, France-West Germany, [1959] Journal
Officiel de la Republique Francaise [J.o.] 11524. The translations of the treaty are taken
from Excerpts from the Extradition Convention Signed Between France and the Federal
Republic of Germany, November 29, 1951 (obtained from the Information Service of the
French Embassy, Washington, D.C.).
23. Newspaper accounts reported, however, that the Israeli Government would request
extradition for Abu Daoud's complicity in other acts as well, i.e., 14 acts of terrorism carried out in Israel from February 1972 to January 1973. THE ECONOMIStT, Jan. 15, 1977,

at 46.
24. Convention on Extradition, Nov. 12, 1958, France-Israel, [1971] J.O. 11268, 805
U.N.T.S. 251.
25. Id.
26. This special terrorist pact consisted of the parallel enactment of similar domestic
laws. France enacted the Statute of July 11, 1975, [1975] J.O. 7219, [1975] Dalloz-Sirey,
Legislation [D.S.L.] 259. This enactment became article 689-1 of the French Code de
procedure p~nale [C. rR. .PE.]. For the Israeli law, see Penal Law Amendment of March 21,
1972, 26 LAws or TmE STATE oF IsRAEL 53, § 4.
27. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, § A, at 6, col. 1; The Times (London), Jan. 12, 1977,
at 1, col. 3.
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After a brief deliberation, the court adopted the major defense
arguments.2 8 The court held that, since the West German warrant

had not been confirmed through diplomatic channels as required
by the applicable convention, there were no legal grounds to
justify Abu Daoud's continued provisional detention pending the
anticipated request for extradition. The court then held that no
action could be taken on the Israeli request to hold Abu Daoud
in custody, citing article 3(5) of the French extradition law,2 9 and
the absence of any act within the scope of the French-Israeli extradition agreement in effect in 1972. Since no other charges had been
made, the court concluded that Abu Daoud should be set free.
Neither Abu Daoud nor his lawyers made a statement in court
regarding his innocence of the alleged terrorist charges. The fact
that Abu Daoud had entered France on a false passport was not
brought up during the proceeding.
The suspected terrorist left France the same afternoon on a
flight to Algiers.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION OF THF. FRENCH COURT
The arrest of Abu Daoud placed the French Government in an

extremely delicate diplomatic position.3 0 While French officials

had taken a strong public stand against transnational terrorism,
they also had cultivated relations with the Arab countries.3 ' Prior
to the arrest, President Vatkry Giscard d'Estaing had announced
plans for an official visit to Saudi Arabia to discuss an oil supply
28. For the official report of the court's decision, see [1977] 51-53 GAz. PAIA s. See also
Le Monde, Jan. IS, 1977, at 2, col. 1 (reporting the French Ministry of Justice's official
summary of the court's decision).
29. The French government may surrender to foreign governments, at their
request, any individual, not a French national or a French subject, found on
the territory of the French Republic or of its colonial possessions, who
is the object of proceedings begun in the name of the requesting State or of
a sentence handed down by its courts.
Nonetheless, extradition shall only be granted if the offense that has occasioned the request was committed:
Either on the territory of the requesting State by a national of that State
or by an alien;
Or outside the territory of that State by one of its nationals;
Or outside its territory by a non-national of the requesting State if the
offense is among those for which French law authorizes prosecution in France
even though they were committed by a foreign national on foreign territory.
Law of March 10, 1972, art. 8(5), [1927] J.O. 2874, [1927] 1 GAz. PALAis 1018.
30. See The Times (London), Jan. 11, 1977, at 6, col. 4.
31. See Ti ECONOMISr, Jan. 15, 1977, at 48, col. 1; Le Monde, Jan. 13, 1977, at 14, col.
3; The Times (London), Jan. 11, 1977, at 6, col. 5.
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agreement; 32 the government was closing a $150 million defense
deal with Egypt 33 and secretly negotiating with Libya to obtain
the release of a French anthropologist who had been held as a
hostage by Chad rebels for over two years.34 The detention and
possible extradition of Abu Daoud posed a serious threat to a
French economy almost totally dependent upon Arab oil. Moreover, some form of terrorist blackmail could be anticipated, threatening the security of France.
In the aftermath of the release of Abu Daoud, many Western
governments and newspapers criticized the decision of the French
court as iaving been politically motivated. The court, they contended, had yielded to the pressure of the French Government
which, in turn, had succumbed to possible Arab oil threats and terrorist blackmail. 0 The court's resort to legal technicalities and its
narrow and extremely technical construction of the applicable conventions appear to merit such criticism. Although the French
court never reached the substantive question of whether the acts
imputed to Abu Daoud were of a political character, the procedural holding seems to indicate the presence of political influences.
The consideration of extrajudicial criteria not only hinders the
eventual punishment of transnational terrorists, but also lessens the
32. The Times (London), Jan. 11, 1977, at 6, col. 5.
33. Barre Interview, supra note 18, at 2.
34. This incident involved the kidnapping of Mrs. Fran oise Claustre, a 8-year-old
French archaeologist and anthropologist, by a small band of Toutou rebels in May 1974.
The French Government had been unable to obtain her release despite promises to pay
an enormous ransom and to deliver arms to the rebels. Prominent officials, newspapers,
and public opinion generally were pressuring the government to resolve the matter. See
N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1975, at 20, col. 1, Sept. 26, 1975, at 6, col. 2, Oct. 3, 1975, at 35,
col. 2, Jan. 11, 1976, at 7, col. 1. In order to secure Mrs. Claustre's release, the French
Government had undertaken secret negotiations with President Kadhafi of Libya whose
influence in Chad is linked to his interest in military expansion in Africa. On January 31,
1977, the leader of the rebels personally escorted Mrs. Claustre and her husband to Libya
and released them to President Kadhafi. The French Government's continued" detention
of Abu Daoud pending extradition requests obviously would have jeopardized the negotiations with President Kadhafi. See Le Monde, Feb. 1, 1977, at 1, col. 3, Feb. 2, 1977, at 2,
col. 1, Feb. 8, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
85. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, § A, at 20, col. 1; Le Monde, Jan. 13, 1977, § A, at 1,
col. 2.
86. See, e.g., Le Monde, Jan. 12, 1977, at 3, col. 1 (adverse reaction of French newspapers); The Guardian (London), Jan. 18, 1977, at 3, col. 1 (criticism by Israeli government); N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, § A, at 20, col. 1 (critical editorial), Jan. 13, 1977, at 3,
col. 1 (criticism by President Carter and Department of State); The Times (London),
Jan. 12, 1977, at 1, col. 1 (reporting technical nature of decision reached, Arab pressure,
Israeli and German reaction).
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viability of the courts as an independent institution of government
and their capacity to dispense justice impartially.
An assessment of the decision, however, must take into account
West Germany's conduct. According to newspaper accounts, the
West German Government shared many of the French apprehensions.37 German legal experts were skeptical about pursuing an
extradition request on the basis of the available evidence. The
government also was anxious about its recently improved relations
with the Arab countries as well as the possibility of terrorist blackmail.3 8 The French court could not have released Abu Daoud on
procedural grounds if the West German Government had followed
the proper procedures under the convention.
As for the Israeli Government, newspaper accounts report that
it was not initially interested in obtaining Abu Daoud since it
believed him to be a Jordanian double agent and, consequently,
an unimportant figure in the Palestinian espionage network.8 9
A. ProceduralProvisions Applicable to the Requests for Abu
Daoud'sExtradition
Under French law, extradition is an act of mutual international
assistance in the repression of crimes and the punishment of criminal offenders.40 A request for extradition is a diplomatic act, involving the legal duties of the national government as they arise
under public international law.4' The final decision on extradition
rests with the executive branch. 42 Although the executive is under
a legal obligation to consult with the judiciary, the judicial functions 3are narrowly defined and subordinate to those of the executive.4
37. See Le Monde, Jan. 12, 1977, § C, at 2, col. 3; The Times (London), Jan. 15, 1977,
at 3, col. 3.
28. See The Guardian (London), Jan. 13, 1977, at 3, col. 1; Le Monde, Jan. 11, 1977,
at 6, col. 2; TIMa, Jan. 24, 1977, at 29, col. 1; The Times (London), Jan. 11, 1977, at 13,
col. 1.
39. See Tnm, Jan. 24, 1977, at 30. But see Rapoport, Between Minimum Courage and
Maximum Cowardice: A Legal Analysis of the Release of Abu Daoud, 3 BRoosXLN J.
INT'L L. 195 (1977).
40. See Aymond, Extradition,[II-Droit Penal] ENcYcLoPr.Di DALwLz ch. 1, § 1, 6 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as AYMOND-DALLoZ].
41. See id. ch. 1, § 1, 4 S_§ 2, J 34.
42. Law of March 10, 1927, arts. 2, 18, [1927] J.O. 2874, 2880, [1927] 1 GAz. PALMS
1019-20. For an analysis of the substance of the law, see Travers, La loi frangaise d'extradition du 10 mars 1927, 54 JouRNAL Du DRorr INTEnNAlloNAL 595 (1927).
43. Law of March 10, 1927, arts. 14-17, [1927] J.O. 2877-79, [1927] 1 GAz. PAAIS 1020.
See also AYMOND-DAMoZ, supra note 40, at ch. 1, § 2, I 36, 38, 40.

504

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:8

In the absence of an applicable treaty provision,44 the Law of.
March 10, 1927 is controlling in matters of extradition. In all
cases, the Chambre d'accusation of the Cour d'appel decides
whether the extradition request is procedurally correct and a denial
of the request is binding upon the executive4 5 Otherwise, the
executive is free to grant or to deny the request on the basis of its
own determination. 46
The arrest of Abu Daoud and the anticipated extradition demands from the West German and Israeli Governments involved
bilateral extradition conventions as well as the French extradition
statute. The West German Government made its request for
extradition pursuant to article 9 of the French-German Extradition Convention: 4
At the direct requesi of the judiciary of the requesting
State, the individual sought shall be arrested provisionally when there is reason to fear that he might avoid
extradition or make it more difficult to ascertain the
truth.
This request must be confirmed at the same time
through diplomatic channels.
The requesting State shall be informed of the provisional arrest or of the reasons why it could not be made.
Article 10 provides that "the provisional detention may be
ended if the surrendering government is not presented, in the 20
days following the arrest, with one of the documents mentioned
in paragraph 2 of article 8 ...

."

The documents of article 8(2)

are "a decision or order of executory conviction, or an arrest warrant or any other writ having the same force issued by the judiciary."
The Israeli request was made pursuant to article 10 of the
French-Israeli Extradition Convention: 48
In an emergency, at the request of the judiciary or the
police of the requesting State, a provisional arrest shall
44. Law of March 10, 1927, art. 1, [1927] J.0. 2874, [1927] 1 GAZ.PALAIS 1018. See also
AYmOND-DALLOZ, supra note 40, at ch. 1, § 2, f 87, 38.
45. Law of March 27, 1927, arts. 16-17, [1927] J.0. 2879, [1927] 1 GAz. PAtAs 1020. See

also AymoND-DALoz, supra note 40, at ch. 1, § 2,

38.

46. Law of March 10, 1927, art. 18, [1927] J.0. 2880, [1927] 1 GAZ. PAIAYS 1020. See also
AYmOND-DALLOZ, supra note 40, at ch. 1, § 2, 38.
47. Convention on Extradition, supra note 22. See also 48 REvuE CuroQn Dz DRorr
INTERNArIONAL PRIVi [R.C.D-I.IP.J 757 (1959).
48. Convention on Extradition, supra note 24.
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be made of the individual sought while transmission of
the documents mentioned in paragraph 2 of the preceding article is awaited ....The request shall mention
that a written arrest warrant or a conviction exists and
that the request is being made with a view to extradition ....49
Articles 9 and 11 of the Convention also were relevant to the
Israeli request for extradition. Article 9 provides that:
The request for extradition shall be made through
diplomatic channels ....The report of the act for which
extradition is requested, the date and place it was committed, its classification and the legal provisions applicable to it, shall be indicated as accurately as possible....
Extradition in this case shall only take place if, in the
opinion of the authorities of the surrendering State,
sufficient proof exists to justify the committal for trial had
the offense been committed on the territory of that
State ....
The relevant language in article 11 reads:
This provisional arrest may be suspended at any time;
it will end ipso jure 60 days following the arrest if the
surrendering State is not in receipt of the extradition request accompanied by the documents listed in article 9.
The release shall not preclude arrest and extradition
should the extradition request come through at a later
date.
Finally, in view of the holding of the French court, 10 article
689-1 of the Code of Penal Procedure and article 4 of the Penal
Code were central to the assessment of the Israeli Government's
extradition request. Article 689-1 provides that "[a]ny foreigner
who, outside the territory of the Republic, has committed or been
an accomplice to a crime can be pursued and judged according to
the requirements of French law, provided the victim of the crime
was a French national." 51 Article 4 of the Penal Code limits the
application of article 689-1, stating that "[n]o crime can be pun49. The translations of the treaty are taken from Excerpts From the Extradition Convention Signed Between France and Israel, November 12, 1958 (obtained from the In-

formation Service of the French Embassy, Washington, D.C.).
50. See text at notes 65-72 infra.
51. C. Pi. PEN. art. 689-1 (Fr.).
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ished by punishments which were not prescribed by law before
they were committed." 62
The traditional principles of French extradition law and the
relevant treaty and code provisions cited above provided the legal
framework in which the court assessed the validity of Abu Daoud's
continued provisional detention.
The West German Request For ProvisionalDetention
Preliminary communications to the French Government indicated that the West German Government would seek the extradition of Abu Daoud for his alleged participation in the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre.5 3 Under article 3 of the French-German
Extradition Convention, 4 that charge was an offense for which
extradition could be requested, unless the act was considered a
'"political offense" or had been judged and punished previously 5
Under the provisions of the Law of March 10, 1927,1; however, the
Chambre d'accusation considered only the narrow question of the
legality of the continued provisional detention of Abu Daoud on
the basis of the information supplied by the West German Government,57 ruling that the preliminary procedural requirements for
detention had not been satisfied.
The court appears to have emphasized unduly the language of
article 9 requiring diplomatic confirmation of the request for provisional detention on the basis of an extremely narrow reading of
the language of the provision.58 West German officials have maintained that the court's interpretation of the above article did not
B.

52. CODE PENALB art. 4 (Fr).
53. See Barre Interview, supra note 18, at 1-2; Communique, supra note 18, at 1.
: sought for crimes... punished by the laws of the contracting parties
54. "[P]ersons.
will be subject to extradition." Convention on
by at least a one year imprisonment .

Extradition, supra note 24, art. 3.
55. Article 4 provides:
Extradition will not be granted if the offense for which it is sought is con-

sidered by the requested party, given the circumstances in which it was committed, as a political offense or as an act committed to prepare such an
offense, to execute it, or committed in view of impeding the commission of a political offense.
Id. art. 4 (author's translation). See also 48 R.CD.I.P. 757, 757 (1959).
56. Law of March 10, 1927, art. 16, [1927] J.O. 2877, [1927] 1 QAZ. PALMs 1020.
57. See Baire Interview, supra note 18, at 3; Communique, supra note 18, at 1.
58. The U.S. D.epartment of State commented that Abu Daoud was released on an
"apparent legal technicality." The Times (London), Jan. 13, 1977, at 1, col. 4. One
French editorialist commented that the court "[avait fait] preuve d'un grand souci de
juridisme." Le Monde, Jan. 13, 1977, § D, at 2, col. 1.
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accord with previous, less stringent practiceY9 They have contended that article 10 gave them 20 days in which to present diplomatic
confirmation."0 The head of the West German Ministry of Justice's
international law section summarized the official West German
reaction when he accused the French court of freeing a terrorist
on a legal technicality."'
French officials have asserted that the West German Government's reluctance to forward diplomatic confirmation justified the
court's reasoning. When the request of January 8 was not confirmed, French officials contacted the German embassy in Paris on
January 10. According to Prime Minister Barre, that effort was
futile:
On Monday [January 10] at 3:00 p.m. the Embassy of
the Federal Republic of Germany informed the [French]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it had no new information regarding the matter. This attitude was all the more
surprising since the request by the German Minister of
the Interior had, three days earlier, been urgent. 59. N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1977, at 19, col. 6, Jan. 12, 1977, § A, at 6, col. 5.
60. Le Monde, Jan. 12, 1977, § C, at 2, col. 3. This reading of the Convention is not
totally justifiable. See text at notes 63-64 infra.
61. N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1977, at 19, col. 6.

62. Barre Interview, supra note 18, at 3. In a press conference on January 17, 1977, in
which he strongly defended the French actions, the President of France, Valry Giscard
d'Estaing, gave a more detailed account of the contacts between the French Government
and the West German Embassy in Paris:
[L]ast Monday the 10th, three days after the first contacts had been made

with the French authorities on this matter, the principal assistant of the
Foreign Minister [Mr. Ulrich] was ordered to meet with the West German
chargi d'affaires to obtain additional details in regard to this matter. The
Ambassador. . . was not in Paris. ...
At 3 o'clock on Monday [afternoon]
Mr. Ulrich . . . met with the West German chargd d'affaires who informed
him that [the West German Embassy had] neither information nor instructions
in regard to this matter. Mr. Ulrich informed him that in view of the importance of the problem and in view of the fact it was now before the
French courts, it was desirable that . . . [the German charge d'affaires]
enter into contact with the attach6 in Bonn who could provide him with the
latest information in regard to this matter and that he [Mr. Ulrich] would
wait for his telephone call ... he would be available day or night.
And Mr. Ulrich was never called . . . . [The court therefore] had no
official communication concerning the extradition request [from West Germany].
L'Affaire Abu Daoud Extraits De La Conference de Presse De Monsieur Val6ry Giscard
d Estaing (obtained from the Information Service of the French Embassy, Washington,
D.C.) (author's translation). The French Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Jacques
Kosdusko-Morizet, also attempted to explain and justify the French actions. Letter to
the Editor, Washington Post, Jan. 23, 1977, at 8, col. 3.
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For the French Government, this constituted a strong indication
of German unwillingness to follow through on their request for
extradition.
While these official pronouncements obviously are not disinterested, they indicate that neither government wanted to pursue
Abu Daoud's extradition.6 3 When viewed in the light of Prime
Minister Barre's remarks, West German criticisms of the French
court decision are much less persuasive. Although there is merit
to the argument that the court was responding to the political
interests of the French Government, the insistence upon the satisfaction of the article 9(3) requirement was justified, at least in part,
by the West German unwillingness to forward diplomatic confirmation. A close reading of article 10 reveals that the 20-day grace
period applies specifically to the extradition documents referred
to in article 8 and not to the diplomatic confirmation requirement
of article 9. Moreover, newspaper accounts report that West
German authorities unofficially viewed Abu Daoud's release with
some relief."4
C. The Israeli Request that Abu Daoud Be Held in. Custody
With a View to Extradition
The French court's holding regarding the Israeli request turned
upon the substantive validity of the anticipated Israeli request for
extradition. Article 3(5) of the French extradition law states that
"[e]xtradition can be granted based on an offense committed outside the territory of the requesting State by a non-national of that
State only if the same type of offense could be prosecuted in France
even though committed by a non-French national outside of
France." "5
Article 689-1 of the French Code of Penal Procedure, effective
January 1, 1976, appears to satisfy this requirement: "Any
foreigner who, outside the territory of the Republic, has rendered
himself guilty of a crime, either as its author or as an accomplice,
can be sought and judged according to the requirements of the
French law, when the victim of this crime is of French nation63. It was suggested that the West German federal structure may have delayed diplomatic contacts. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, § A, at 6, col. 5. In the light of subsequent
developments, this early thesis is unpersuasive.
64. See, e.g., Le Monde, Jan. 12, 1977, § C, at 2, col. 3; The Times (London), Jan.

15, 1977, at 3, col. 3. Apparently German legal experts questioned whether the evidence
against Dkoud was sufficient to obtain either extradition or an eventual conviction. Le
Monde, Jan. 12, 1977, § C, at 2, col. 3; The Times (London), Jan. 15, 1977, at 3, col. 3.
65. Law of March 10, 1927, art. 3(5), [1927] J.O. 2874, [1927] 1 GAz. PAIAis 1018.
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ality." Il However, the French court reasoned that article 689-1
could not be applied retroactively because it is a criminal law.
Since it had been adopted some three years after the Munich incident, the requirement6 7of article 3 was not met, and Abu Daoud
could not be detained.
The court appears to have overstepped its jurisdiction by ruling
upon the merits of the Israeli request for extradition. The Chambre d'accusation was convened to determine whether the provisional detention of the suspected terrorist was in conformity with
the procedures laid out in the applicable convention; it was not
sitting to rule upon an extradition request that had not been made.
Israeli officials contend that their embassy in Paris was never informed that the in camera proceeding was to take place. As a consequence, Israel did not have an opportunity to present arguments
through the public prosecutor concerning the validity of the
forthcoming extradition request. " Press reports indicate that the
Israelis planned to seek Abu Daoud's extradition on the basis of
alleged terrorist acts committed on Israeli territory as well as in
Munich. Such a claim would have satisfied the article 3 requirement.!" As a result, the Chambre d'accusation,which had jurisdiction to review only the procedural regularity of the request for
provisional detention, actually judged the merits of an extradition
request which had not been made.
The court also appears to have ignored the applicable provisions
of the French-Israeli Extradition Convention. The Israeli request
for provisional detention fulfilled the requirements of the Convention.70 The court, however, relied exclusively upon the provisions of the French extradition statute, ignoring the well-settled
rule of French law that, in the event of a conflict between a domestic law and a treaty, the latter will control. 1
66. C. PR.

rN. art. 689-1 (Fr.).
67. See text at notes 28-29 supra. See also Roubache, supra note 18, at 3-4.
68. The Guardian (London), Jan. 13, 1977, at 3, col. 1.
69. Given the context in which the alleged crimes were committed, the political offense
exception would likely have been raised as a defense in a hearing on the substantive issues
raised by the extradition requests. This question is crucial to the eventual success or failure
of the legal struggle against transnational terrorism. For general discussions of the issue,
see M. BAssIOUNr, INTERNATONAL ExannsrxoN AND WORLD PUBLic ORm 370 (1974);
L OPPENHEINT, INTERNATIONAL LAw 393 (1905); Lillich & Paxman, supra note 1, at 303;
The Political Offense Exception to Extradition and Transuational Terrorists: Old Doctrine
Reformulated and New Norms Created, 1 AsIs INTL' L.J. 1 (1977).
70. Those requirements are outlined in the text at notes 48-52 supra.

71. "The treaties or agreements that are duly ratified or approved have, from the
moment of their publication, an authority superior to that of the laws, with the reserva-
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The obvious dichotomy between the resort to legal technicalities
and the failure to consider fundamental points of law strongly suggests that the court was searching for some sort of legal justification
of a foregone political conclusion, rather than objectively applying
legal rules and principles to the particular circumstances of the
case. Under established law, the complex substantive legal question should have been dealt with in a separate proceeding in which
the parties concerned could have presented their case.
The failure of the French public prosecutor to object to the
presentation of arguments concerning the validity of an anticipated
extradition request, and the court's incorporation of these arguments into its decision, suggests, even more forcefully than the
ruling on the German request, that the court yielded to political
pressure. While the extradition of Abu Daoud to West Germany
would have been unpalatable, his extradition to Israel was politically inconceivable.7 2 The French Government made no attempt to
justify the court's holding in regard to the Israeli extradition request, except to reiterate the court's reasoning as though it were
justified intrinsically.Y
IV.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Before making an assessment of the impact of the Abu Daoud
case on the struggle against transnational terrorism, it should be
noted that both the facts of the case and the foregoing analysis have
left one question unresolved: given his notorious reputation, why
was Abu Daoud sent to Paris in the first place? A number of possible explanations come to mind. First, the PLO may have wanted
Abu Daoud to be arrested in Paris in order to sabotage the French
role in securing an eventual settlement in the Middle East or to
test French support for its cause. Second, the French Government,
knowing Abu Daoud's identity, allowed him to enter France as a
friendly gesture to the PLO in an effort to advance its position
in the Middle East. The government's plans then were thwarted
by the French domestic intelligence agency (DST) which, when
alerted by the intelligence agencies of other countries, arrested
Abu Daoud either on orders from the Ministry of the Interior or
independently to avenge the death of two of its agents who had
tion for each agreement or treaty that it be applied by the other party." CoNsr-UITION
art. 55 (Fr.) (author's translation).
72. See The Times (London), Jan. 11, 1977, at 13, col. 1.
73. See Barre Interview, supra note 18, at 4; Communique, supra note 18, at 2.
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been shot in Paris the previous74year while attempting to apprehend
other transnational terrorists.
The second scenario casts the objectives of French foreign policy
and the means used to implement them in a cynical, if not illegal,
light. The French Government is seen as attempting to gain influence in the Middle East through complicity with terrorists. It
also raises serious questions about the role of secret police forces in
democratic States. The French domestic intelligence agency is seen
as subverting the policy determinations of a democratically-elected
government. Such activity transforms the struggle against transnational terrorism into another form of terrorism which, although
originating in legitimate institutions, would be just as disruptive
of the harmony of the international community. Moreover, it
would block effectively any emerging consensus between States on
the question of terrorism, since individual States could not guarantee subsequent implementation of national policies on terrorism.
It appears probable, however, especially in the light of statements
made by a former French intelligence director,75 that the DST took
no independent action. The apparent inconsistency between Abu
Daoud's unimpeded entry into France and his subsequent arrest
by French police can be explained by confusion arising at the
highest levels of policymaking in the French Government, specifically between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
the Interior." Such confusion would explain the nature of the
decision that was made: since Abu Daoud's entry into France involved official complicity with an alleged transnational terrorist,
knowledge of that policy and its implementation had to remain
confined to a select group-high-ranking officials of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Thus, it was impossible for officials in the Ministry
of the Interior to coordinate their action with their counterparts
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Regardless of which of the foregoing hypotheses best explains
the incident, it is dear that the Abu Daoud case was more than a
"simple police matter," as the French Government first contended. 7T The extremely unusual circumstances in which the court
acted, as well as the strained and highly technical character of its
decision, are indicative of the political importance of the matter
and possibly of the pressure exerted upon the court to reach an
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Le Monde, Jan. 11, 1977, at 6, col. 3, Jan. 12, 1977, at 7, col. 3.
Le Monde, Jan. 13, 1977, at 7, col. 3.
See Le Monde, Jan. 12, 1977, at 5, col. 1.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1977, at 4, col. 3.
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immediate decision which conformed to the French Government's
political assessment of the matter.
Without condoning the deficiencies of the French court's decision, one can still note that the U.S. propensity to view law as
an instrument for achieving change in the international community
is not shared by French lawyers and magistrates.7 The French legal
system maintains a strict distinction between law, which is seen as
an appropriate instrument for the resolution of private disputes,
and such issues as the interpretation of treaty obligations, which
are seen as primarily political rather than legal matters and.consequently are within the exclusive province of the executive branch
of government. 9
Given this caveat, the French Government, when confronted
with the choice of taking an unbending position in regard to transnational terrorism or yielding to the possible threat of oil boycotts
and terrorist blackmail, was free to pursue a course of political
expediency. Its discretion, however, did not include the right to
dress the self-serving political character of its choice in the cloak
of judicial impartiality. Since proof of direct interference is not
available, one might argue that the decision simply reflected the
personal view of the judges as to what was best for their country
in these circumstances. The highly technical reasoning of the decision, however, and its perfect suitability as a legal justification of
a foregone political conclusion make that argument unacceptable. 0
The more plausible, albeit extreme, explanation of what happened
is executive interference with the theoretically independent judiciary."' If this thesis is accepted, the political manipulation of the
court was abhorrent simply because it was unnecessary in light of
the fact that the executive branch has ultimate authority in matters
of extradition and the judiciary plays only an advisory role. 2 The
French Government should-have taken responsibility for its policy
determination without hiding behind an extremely questionable
judicial decision.
A fair analysis of the implications of the Abu Daoud case upon
the integrity of French political and judicial institutions as well
78. See R. DAVID, FRENcit LAW 71 (1972); R. DAvrD & H. DE VRImos THE FREc LEGAL
SYsmM 45 (1958).
79. See R. DAVID, FRENCH L.iW 98-107 (1972).
80. Another possible influence on the decision may have been the French judges' concern for career advancement. Interview with Peter Herzog, Professor of Law, Syracuse
University, in Charlottesville, Virginia (March 4, 1977).
81. See Le Monde, Jan. 13, 1977, at 3, col. I.
82. See text at notes 42-43 supra.
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as upon the struggle against transnational terrorism must take into
account the fact that neither the French Government nor the
Chambre d'accusation acted in isolation. The West German
Government's retreat into self-serving diplomatic silence is no more
laudable than the action of its French counterpart. Both governments chose to follow a course of political expediency rather than
adopt an unyielding policy toward transnational terrorism-a policy
which would have threatened their political and economic interests. Since realistic decisionmaking is the essence of national
survival, neither the French nor the West German Governments
can be said to have acted in a substandard fashion. Indeed, there is
little evidence that other Western democracies, although quick to
3
chastise the French court's decision, would have acted differently.
The Abu Daoud case underscores the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of reconciling the immediate interests of a State with
the long range goals of a coherent international policy against transnational terrorism. Even if political realism justified these decisions, the actions undermined the apparent consensus embodied in
the recently signed European Convention Against Terrorism."
New conventions or laws, however, are not the entire solution;
in a more immediate perspective, what is needed is to have the political authorities of all countries invoke existing legal sanctions
against suspected or convicted terrorists. This should be done despite threats of oil embargos or terrorist reprisals. The only way to
lessen the threat of terrorist blackmail is to create a firm legal
consensus in which each member of the international community
binds itself without reservation to the prosecution or extradition of
terrorists, even if political and economic interests are threatened.
The outcome of the Abu Daoud case is testimony to the fact that
such a consensus is a distant, if not illusory, goal.
THOMAS E. GARBONNEAU
83. See The Times (London), Jan. 19, 1977, at 15, col. 4.
84. Council of Europe: European Convention On The Suppression of Terrorism,
reprinted in 15 INr'L LEGAL MATnmrs 1272 (1976). The Convention was opened to
signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe on January 27, 1977. It was
signed by seventeen countries, including France and West Germany. See 16 INT'L LEGAL
MAzRALs 233 (1977).
The Convention purports to limit the "political offense" exception, but the language
of article 5, restoring the discretion of individual States, could substantially lessen its
value. For a discussion of the Convention, see The Political Offense Exception to Extradition and TransuationalTerrorists: Old Doctrine Reformulated and New Norms Created,
.supranote 69.

